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Abstract
Social scientists have long speculated about individuals' tendencies to misrepre-
sent their preferences in order to aect the outcome of social choice mechanisms.
The fact that preference orderings are generally unobserved, however, has made
it very dicult to document strategic behavior empirically. Exploiting the incen-
tive structure of Germany's voting system to solve the fundamental identication
problem, this paper estimates the extent of strategic voting in large, real-world
elections. The evidence indicates that approximately 35% of voters abandon their
most preferred candidate if she is not in contention for victory. As predicted by
theory, tactical behavior has a non-trivial impact on individual races. Yet, as one
aggregates across districts, these distortions partially oset each other, resulting in
considerably more modest eects on the overall distribution of seats.
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1. Introduction
Democracy is rooted in the conviction that collective choices should be based on the prefer-
ences of all members of society. To provide citizens with an opportunity to participate in the
decision making process, almost all democratic states rely on elections. Yet, as a mechanism
for eliciting and aggregating preferences, elections are known to be awed (Arrow 1951).
Among other theoretical shortcomings, practically every reasonable voting system fails to be
strategy-proof (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975). As a result, strategic voters may be able
to aect the outcome of an election by misrepresenting their true preferences.
Although social scientists have long speculated about individuals' proclivities to cast tac-
tical ballots (e.g., Black 1948; Downs 1957; Duverger 1954; Farquharson 1969; Sen 1970),
and despite a plethora of anecdotal evidence, it has proven extremely dicult to document
strategic behavior empirically. The key problem is that voters' tastes are generally unob-
served. Without imposing further assumptions it is, therefore, impossible to know whether
ballots accurately reect the underlying preference orderings and to what extent tactical
voting changes electoral outcomes. In fact, in an important paper Degan and Merlo (2009)
prove that any cross-section of votes can be rationalized by some utility function, without
resorting to strategic behavior.
While there are many ways in which agents could be strategic, this paper focuses on testing
one of the central assumptions in social choice theory. According to the theory, individuals
behave strategically by choosing someone other than their most preferred candidate whenever
the latter is believed to have no chance of winning. Conversely, agents who vote for their
favorite contestant regardless of whether she is in contention for victory are said to be
sincere.1
In order to resolve the fundamental identication problem, the present paper exploits
the incentive structure of parliamentary elections in Germany. Under the German system
individuals have two votes. Both are submitted simultaneously, but are associated with very
dierent incentives. The list vote is cast for a party and counted on the national level. Up to
a rst-order approximation, list votes determine the distribution of seats in the Bundestag.
Since mandates are awarded on a proportional basis (conditional on clearing a 5%-threshold),
it is in practically every agent's best interest to reveal his true preferences over which party
he wishes to gain the marginal seat by voting for said party.2
1Naturally, issues of tactical voting do not arise in elections with only two candidates. In such cases even
strategic voters simply select their favorite contestant.
2Note well, individuals' preferences over which party wins the marginal seat in parliament need not coincide
with their deep ideological convictions. Nevertheless, it is useful to think of preferences in this narrowly de-
ned way, as it conditions on expectations about post-election coalition formation, the inuence of campaign
activities, etc.
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By contrast, the candidate vote is counted in a rst-past-the-post system on the district
level. Whoever wins the plurality of votes in a given district is automatically elected to
parliament. Votes cast for any other contestant are \lost." Although the candidate vote is
primarily used to determine the identity of local representatives, by securing a dispropor-
tionate share of districts parties may actually increase their seat totals (see Section 3 for
details). Critically, when it comes to choosing among dierent candidates, voters have a
clear incentive to behave tactically. As in all elections under plurality rule, they should never
vote for their favorite party's nominee if she is known to be \out of the race."
Figure 1 demonstrates how observing the same individuals under both electoral regimes
facilitates identication. For the sake of illustration, suppose that candidates are perfect rep-
resentatives of their parties and that it is known a priori who has a realistic chance of winning.
First, entertain the possibility that all voters cast sincere ballots. As shown in the panels on
the left, if this were indeed the case, there would be a one-to-one correspondence between
list and candidate votes|irrespective of whether the particular candidate is a contender.
Next, assume that all voters behave tactically. In such a world only candidates who are
believed to be in contention for victory should receive any votes. Thus, for non-contenders
the curve representing the relationship between list and candidate votes ought to be perfectly
at.3
Lastly, consider the case in which there are both sincere and strategic types. As before, sin-
cere agents vote for their preferred candidate, but no tactical type chooses a non-contender.
Consequently, the line relating non-contenders' share of the candidate vote to their parties'
list votes must have a slope between zero and one. It is this slope that identies the fraction
of voters who are sincere.
Of course, not all candidates are perfect representatives of their parties|despite the fact
that party platforms are much more salient in Germany than in the U.S. Some candidates
are more charismatic, better qualied, or have a higher media prole than others. Supporters
of rival parties might, therefore, be \drawn in" by a candidate's personal appeal. Conditional
on being out of the race, however, theory predicts that even high valence contestants will be
deserted by all of their strategic supporters. Hence, after carefully controlling for candidate
quality, the partial correlation between non-contenders' list and candidate votes continues
to measure the fraction of agents who stick with their preferred contestant despite her being
\out of the race."4
3Strictly speaking, the shape of the curve for contenders is indeterminate. While it has to lie weakly
above the origin and must end at (100%; 100%), the slope at intermediate points will generally depend on
the correlation of preferences. If, however, tastes are approximately uncorrelated within precincts, then one
would expect an almost one-to-one relationship between list and candidate votes.
4Naturally, there exist more elaborate models in which voters are reluctant to abandon high valence
candidates. Empirically, however, there is no evidence that this is the case. If anything, there is a small
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To account for heterogeneity across candidates this paper uses previously unavailable
precinct level data from the 2005 and 2009 federal elections. In Germany, precincts are
the smallest administrative units at which votes are counted, and each precinct is fully con-
tained within one electoral district. Since races take place at the district level, these data
allow for the slopes in Figure 1 to be estimated from within-candidate variation only, thereby
conditioning on the characteristics of candidates and their competitors, beliefs about pivot
probabilities, etc.
Figure 2 provides an empirical example from the 2009 election in District 207. Each panel
plots a candidate's own vote share against her party's share of the list vote in the same
precinct. In contrast to the contestants in the top row, those in the bottom two rows were
widely believed to have no chance of winning. As one would expect if list votes were a
good proxy for individuals' preferences, after allowing for candidate specic intercepts there
is an almost one-to-one relationship between list and candidate votes for contenders. Non-
contenders, however, are deserted by a signicant number of supporters.
An important remaining obstacle is that it is often unknown which candidates were con-
sidered to be \in the race." If voters had perfect foresight then only an election's winner
and runner-up should have been expected to be in contention for victory. In reality, however,
voters are likely to have noisy priors and may consider more than just two candidates to
be serious contenders. Reassuringly, the main ndings are qualitatively and quantitatively
robust to more than twenty-ve alternative ways of classifying contestants.
Thus, irrespective of how agents are ultimately assumed to form beliefs about which candi-
dates are in contention for victory, the results in this paper show that approximately 35% of
voters abandon their most preferred candidate if she is believed to have no chance of winning.
Two key pieces of evidence indicate that defection is, in fact, driven by strategic considera-
tions. First, not only do individuals who abandon their favorite contestant substitute toward
the nominee of a potential coalition partner, but desertion rates themselves are much higher
among voters faced with at least one palatable alternative than among those who can only
choose among two evils. Second, estimates of strategic voting are substantially larger for
elections perceived as \critical" than for ordinary ones. Alternative explanations, such as
agents receiving utility from supporting the eventual winner of the election, are rejected by
the data.
Counterfactual election results demonstrate that in the absence of any strategic behavior
about one in ten districts would change hands. However, as one aggregates across districts,
these \distortions" partially oset each other, resulting in only modest eects on the overall
negative correlation between the measured quality of a contestant and the fraction of voters who abandon
her.
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distribution of seats.
The results in this paper speak directly to large theoretical literatures on tactical voting
(e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Carroll 2011; Cox 1994; Feddersen and Pesendorfer
1996; Myatt 2007, 2012; Myerson 2002; Myerson and Weber 1993) and strategyproofness
in social choice (see Barbera 2011 for a recent review). On a purely descriptive level, the
empirical evidence indicates that the fundamental prediction in rational choice studies of
voting holds for some, but by no means all, individuals. The evidence also suggests that it
is important to distinguish the impact of strategic voting on a given race from its eect on
seat totals.
Moreover, the ndings presented below may aid in the formulation of political economy
models. Often, these models require an assumption regarding the voting behavior of agents,
and the conclusion may depend critically on whether voters are taken to be tactical or sincere
(compare, for instance, Besley and Coate 1997 with Osborne and Slivinski 1996
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section oers a brief review of the
existing empirical literature. Section 3 outlines the crucial features of Germany's electoral
system. Section 4 introduces a formal model of sincere and strategic voting, and Section 5
provides a rst look at the data. The main results appear in Section 6. Section 7 presents
counterfactual experiments to analyze the impact of strategic behavior. The last section
concludes.5
2. Previous Literature
There exists a large empirical literature on strategic voting and turnout. While laboratory
experiments provide generally convincing evidence of tactical behavior (e.g., Duy and Tavits
2008; Eckel and Holt 1989; Forsythe et al. 1993, 1996), real-world results tend to be mixed.
Coate et al. (2008), for instance, reject the pivotal voter model based on the nding that
it is unable to replicate winning margins in Texas liquor referenda. Reed (1990) and Cox
(1994), however, argue that the distribution of votes in Japan's multimember districts con-
forms roughly to the predictions of rational choice theory. More recently, Fujiwara (2011)
uses a sharp regression discontinuity in Brazilian mayoral elections to show that third-place
candidates are more likely to be deserted in races under simple plurality rule than in runo
elections. The most comprehensive study to date is Cox (1997). His ndings are suggestive
of strategic behavior in a number of electoral systems, but indicate a lack thereof in others.
5There are four appendices. Appendix A explains the algorithm for calculating each party's number of
seats in the Bundestag. Appendix B presents a simple model of voting under plurality rule to clarify in which
sense agents can be expected to cast sincere list votes, and Appendix C contains a formal proof omitted
from the body of the paper. Lastly, precise denitions of all variables used throughout the analysis appear
in Appendix D.
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Even less is known about the extent of tactical voting. Two notable exceptions are Spenkuch
(2013) as well as Kawai and Watanabe (2013). Spenkuch (2013) exploits a highly unusual
by-election in Germany, which allowed a party to gain one seat by receiving fewer votes,
to derive a 9% lower bound. Kawai and Watanabe (2013) estimate a structural model of
voting decisions in Japan's general election, concluding that between 63% and 85% of voters
are strategic. Their counterfactual experiments suggest that tactical voting had a signicant
impact on the distribution of seats.
Recall, the fundamental diculty in inferring strategic behavior from naturally occurring
variation is that voters' preferences are not observed. Thus, any conclusions must either be
based on indirect tests (as in Coate et al. 2008; Cox 1997; Fujiwara 2011; Spenkuch 2013),
or preferences need to be estimated in order to compare them to actual vote counts (as in
Kawai and Watanabe 2013).
A separate strand of the literature tries to circumvent this problem by using survey data on
voting decisions and political orientations (see, e.g., Abramson et al. 1992; Blais et al. 2001;
Kiewiet 2013; Niemi et al. 1993; or, for Germany, Gschwend 2007; Pappi and Thurner 2002).
Estimates in this tradition are typically very low. Wright (1990, 1992), however, points to
important survey biases and raises serious doubts about conclusions based on self-reported
votes. Alvarez and Nagler (2000) even show that, depending on the survey design, estimates
of strategic voting dier by as much as a factor of seven.
3. Germany's Electoral System
In order to shed light on the prevalence of strategic voting, the present paper exploits the
structure of parliamentary elections in Germany. Elections to the Bundestag are held ac-
cording to a mixed member system with approximately proportional representation. Except
for minor modications, the same system has been in place since 1953.6
As mentioned in the introduction, each voter casts two dierent votes (see Figure A.1 in
the Appendix for a sample ballot). The rst vote, or candidate vote (Erststimme), is used to
elect a constituency representative in each of 299 single-member districts. The second vote,
or list vote (Zweitstimme), is cast for a party and counted on the national level.
District representatives are determined in a rst-past-the-post system. That is, whichever
contestant achieves the plurality of candidate votes in a given district is automatically
awarded a seat in the legislature. Winners are said to hold direct mandates, and votes cast
for any other candidate are discarded.
Figure 4 shows the party aliation of all district winners in the 2005 and 2009 elections.
Although the CDU/CSU secured the majority of direct mandates in both years, there remains
6In describing the German electoral system this section borrows from Spenkuch (2013).
5
ample geographic variation, as well as some variation over time. Of the ve major parties
only the FDP did not win any districts|despite gaining a non-trivial fraction of votes.7
To still achieve approximately proportional representation of all parties clearing a 5%-
threshold, the German electoral system also awards list mandates. First, all list votes are
aggregated up to the national level and a total of 598 preliminary seats are distributed to
parties on a proportional basis. Each party's allotment is then broken down to the state
level, and compared to its number of direct mandates in the same state. Whichever number
is greater determines how many seats the party will actually receive.
More formally, let dp;s denote the number of districts that party p won in state s, and
let lp;s be how many mandates it would have received in the same state under proportional
representation. Then, the nal number of seats that p retains in s equals
np;s = max fdp;s; lp;sg ;
and its total in the Bundestag is given by np =
P
s np;s (see Appendix A for a detailed
description of the algorithm used to allocate seats).
If dp;s < lp;s, then in addition to the district winners the rst lp;s   dp;s candidates on p's
list are elected as well. Otherwise, only holders of direct mandates receive a seat. Parties
are said to win overhang mandates (Uberhangmandate) whenever dp;s > lp;s. In such cases
the total number of seats in the Bundestag increases beyond 598. Note, however, the total
number of mandates awarded under proportional representation, i.e.
P
p
P
s lp;s, exceeds the
number of districts,
P
p
P
s dp;s, by a factor of two. Thus, situations in which dp;s > lp;s are
fairly rare. Consequently, the list vote determines the overall distribution of seats up to a
rst-order approximation.8
Critical for the purposes of this paper are the incentives associated with each vote. First,
consider the list vote. Due to the fact that seat totals are approximately proportional to
parties' vote shares and given that it is nearly impossible to predict rounding, most agents
can be expected to choose their \preferred" party, dened as the one they would like to win
the marginal seat in parliament (conditional on their expectations regarding post-election
coalition formation, etc.).
Using this denition of preferences, it is easy to see that voting for one's preferred party is
a strictly dominant action whenever E [dp;s] < E [l p;s]. Only if one anticipates that dp;s > l p;s
may it not be optimal to do so. However, most voters cannot reasonably assign a high prob-
7Since the introduction of the two-ballot system in 1953 no independent candidate has ever won a district.
8Theoretically, overhang mandates may lead to departures from proportionality of up to one third of all
seats. In the current equilibrium, deviations are much smaller. For instance, relative to its share of the list
vote, the CDU/CSU received an additional 7 mandates in 2005, whereas the SPD secured 9 extra seats.
6
ability to this event. Historically, it occurred for less than 10% of state-party combinations,
and FDP, Greens, as well as The Left have never won any overhang mandates. The vast
majority of individuals has, therefore, an ex ante incentive to cast truthful list votes.9
When it comes to the candidate vote, however, agents have a clear incentive to behave
tactically|as in all elections under plurality rule. If their preferred candidate is known to
be \out of the race," then one can always do strictly better by voting for somebody else.
Substituting toward a contestant who actually has a chance of winning could benet a
coalition partner, or it might spoil a particularly disliked party's victory. Even if voters took
the aggregate distribution of seats as given, by casting tactical ballots they can elect \better"
local representatives. Although expected payos may not be large, as long as individuals are
not completely indierent to who carries their district, they should never waste their vote
on a candidate who is \out of the race."10
4. A Model of Sincere and Strategic Voting
In order to formalize this intuition and frame the empirical work to follow, this section
introduces a simple model of voting under plurality rule. Instead of considering the complete
decision problem associated with list and candidate votes in Germany, it is more useful to
focus on the race for a direct mandate in one electoral district, i.e. on a single subgame.
The model is a straightforward extension of Myerson and Weber (1993) with the addition of
sincere voters, stochastic turnout, and endogenous pivot probabilities.11
4.1. Basic Building Blocks
Let the set of candidates be denoted by K = f1; 2; : : : ; kg. Members of the electorate (simul-
taneously) cast single nontransferable votes, and the contestant with the highest vote total
is declared the winner of the election. Ties are broken by the ip of a fair coin.
Voters are either sincere or tactical,  2 fs; tg. Sincere voters always choose their most
preferred candidate, whereas tactical agents act based on personal preferences as well as
their beliefs about the actions of other players in the game. The share of agents who are
sincere is given by  2 [0; 1].
Each voter has strict preferences over candidates summarized by a vector u = (u1; : : : ; uk)
in some nite set U  Rk, where ui is the expected utility from candidate i winning the
9The results in this paper are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to focusing on state-party combi-
nantions for which dp;s  l p;s (see Section 6.3).
10At rst, the German system may seem very complicated. Yet, the results of Spenkuch (2013) show that
voters are keenly aware of the incentives at work.
11Appendix B presents a simple model of voting in the plurality rule part of the German system, and
claries in which sense agents can be expected to cast sincere list votes.
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district (conditional on the expected outcomes in all other districts as well as the expected
realization of the national list vote). f(u) denotes the fraction of individuals with a particular
preference prole. That is, f is a probability distribution over U . A voter's type is dened
as the tuple (u; ) 2 I  U  fs; tg. For simplicity, u and  are assumed to be independent
random variables.
Agents know their own type, but are uncertain about the number of other players in the
game. This captures the idea that real world elections are characterized by substantial un-
certainty about turnout, and that voters are typically not aware of everybody else's identity.
Following Myerson (1998, 2000), assume that the total number of voters is a random vari-
able drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean n < 1. n, f , as well as  are common
knowledge.12
As mentioned above, strategic agents maximize expected utility taking the behavior of
others into account. More specically, tactical voters choose candidate k only if doing so
maximizes
(1) u (k; eju; t) = 1
2
X
k02Knfkg
e(k; k0) [uk   uk0 ] ;
where e = (e (k; k0))k;k02K denotes players' common beliefs about the probability of casting
a pivotal vote.13
By contrast, sincere players always select their most preferred contestant. They maximize
the utility function:
u (k; eju; s) = uk:
4.2. Equilibrium
Let  (kju; ) denote voters' strategies. That is,  : I !  (K) species the probability that
a type (u; ) voter casts a ballot for candidate k. In equilibrium it must be the case that, for
all (u; ) 2 I,
 (kju; ) > 0 only if k 2 arg max
k02K
u (k; eju; ) :
12The Poisson assumption is made for convenience. None of the empirical results depend on it. For a
mathematically more rigorous model of strategic voting see Palfrey (1989).
13To see that (1) follows from expected utility maximization note that an individual's vote aects his
payo only if it changes the outcome of the election, i.e. if two candidates are either tied for rst or one
vote apart. If candidate k and k0 are tied, then voting for the former results in an expected utility gain of
uk   12 (uk + uk0). If k is one vote behind k0, then choosing k changes payos by 12 (uk + uk0)  uk0 , which is
the same as the previous expression. Summing over all candidate pairs and weighting by e gives (1).
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Given , realized vote totals, v = (v (k))k2K , are random variables with means,  =
( (k))k2K , equal to
(2)  (k) = n
X
u2U
[ (kju; s) + (1  ) (kju; t)] f (u) .
From the Poisson assumption it follows that the elements of v are independently distributed
(see Myerson 1998 for a proof), which allows the probability of casting the pivotal vote to be
expressed in a transparent way. More specically, not knowing the exact number of players
in the game, the ex ante probability of candidate k being tied for rst or one vote behind k0
is given by
 (k; k0) =
1X
=1
24 ( =  j (k)) +1X
 0=
 ( =  0j (k0))
!0@ Y
k002Knfk;k0g
 1X
 00=0
 ( =  00j (k00))
1A35 ;
where  ( =  j (k)) denotes the probability of a Poisson random variable  with parameter
 (k) being equal to  .14
Definition: Given the Poisson game   (K; I; n; f; ), a voting equilibrium consists of a
strategy function  satisfying, for all (u; ) 2 I,
(i)  (kju; )  0 8k 2 K,
(ii)
P
k2K  (kju; ) = 1, and
(iii)  (kju; ) > 0 only if k 2 arg maxk02K u (k0; eju; );
as well as a set of beliefs such that
(iv) e (k; k0) =  (k; k0) 8k; k0 2 K.
Proposition 1: The set of voting equilibria is always non-empty.
Proof: See Appendix C.
To get a sense of what equilibrium play looks like note that strategic voters' utility function
is homogenous in e. Hence, tactical voting decisions are determined by the relative|not
absolute|size of perceived pivot probabilities. From the magnitude theorem in Myerson
(2000) it follows that some pivot probabilities are going to be several orders of magnitude
larger than others; although for large electorates all elements of  will be very close to zero.
That is, as n!1 most pivot probabilities become innitesimal relative to, at most, a few
14As is typical in the literature on strategic voting, the probability of three-way ties is assumed to be
negligible.
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remaining ones. Intuitively, this is because homogeneity of the utility function implies thate (k; k0) can be rewritten as the probability of k and k0 running neck-and-neck ahead of all
other contestants, conditional on the election being tied in the rst place. Such a tie, however,
is substantially more likely to involve the two front-runners than an underdog. Hence, almost
all of the probability mass must be concentrated in one or two candidate pairs, which gives
rise to the following corollary.
Corollary: In large elections only a subset of candidates will be \in the race," and strate-
gic voters behave as if choosing only among those candidates who are believed to be serious
contenders.
Since tactical agents become more inclined to select a particular candidate as they form
favorable beliefs about her being in contention for victory|say, because her standing in
pre-election polls improves, or due to campaign activities that manipulate voters' perception
of candidate viability|the model above exhibits the potential for bandwagon eects and
self-fullling prophecies (Simon 1954). In general there may be multiple equilibria, and any
candidate that is not a Condorcet loser may be the sole likely winner under plurality rule (cf.
Myerson and Weber 1993). Thus, without further renement the model makes no prediction
about the set of candidates who will be \in the race," i.e. which of the possible equilibria is
being observed by the econometrician.
4.3. Mapping Theory into Data
For identifying the share of strategic voters, however, this is less of a problem than it may
seem. The key takeaway from the discussion above is that it is not optimal for strategic
agents to vote for a candidate who is \out of the race," i.e. for whom tie probabilities are
orders of magnitude smaller than for other candidates. It must, therefore, be the case that
 (kju; t) = 0 for all candidates who are \non-contenders," whereas  (kju; s) equals either
0 or 1, depending on whether type (u; s) agents prefer k over every other contestant. Given
these strategies and focusing on candidates believed to be \out of the race," equation (2)
simplies to
 (k) =n = 
X
eu2fu2U juk>uk08k0g f (eu) .
The left-hand side of this expression denotes k's share of the candidate vote, whereas the
right-hand side equals the share of strategic voters multiplied by the fraction of agents who
favor k.
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Thus, if one can nd a subset of candidates who voters must have believed to be out of the
race given the equilibrium being played, and if one accepts the assumption that list votes are
not only a (potentially noisy) measure of voters' preferences over parties, but also a proxy
for the fraction of individuals who favor the respective nominees, i.e. for
Peu f (eu), then  can
be identied from the candidate-list vote gradient among these non-contenders. Of course,
for the latter assumption to be reasonable it is important to properly account for systematic
dierences in candidates' idiosyncratic appeal.
5. A First Look at the Data
5.1. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
Before doing so it is useful to get a sense of the broad patterns in the data. Table 1 shows
aggregate frequencies of dierent list and candidate vote combinations in the 2009 federal
election.15 First and foremost, the evidence suggests that some, but not all voters desert
weak candidates. Although nominees of FDP, Greens, and other minor parties are rarely
in contention for victory, they are abandoned by only about half of their followers. At the
same time, the numbers show that, conditional on abandoning their own party's candidate,
about 83% of all FDP supporters voted for a contestant of the CDU|its coalition partner|
whereas 72% of Green Party adherents chose an SPD nominee. It, therefore, appears that
voters who do desert non-contenders substitute toward close political allies.
Though indicative of strategic voting, Table 1 is ultimately insucient to determine its
extent. For instance, some FDP supporters might have chosen CDU candidates not because
of tactical considerations, but because they are better qualied or more charismatic. Also,
not all CDU and SPD adherents voted for their own party's nominee. In fact, almost one
third of those who deviate end up picking a political rival. While it is possible that these
voters chose among the lesser of two evils in districts in which the CDU or the SPD candidate
happened to be \out of the race," it is also plausible that their voting decisions were solely
based on candidate idiosyncrasies.
In fact, the descriptive statistics in Table 2A demonstrate that candidates dier along
important dimensions.16 For instance, only 19% of CDU candidates are female, compared
to 35% of Social Democrats and 34% of Green Party nominees. Moreover, relative to their
FDP, Left, or Green Party counterparts, contestants of CDU and SPD are about four times
more likely to be a current member of parliament, and more than forty times as likely to
15Table 1 is based on a 3.9% random sample of actual votes. German electoral law requires the Federal
Returning Ocer to publish descriptive statistics on vote combinations, as well as voting behavior by age
and gender (see Bundeswahlleiter 2010). Unfortunately, the micro-data are not publicly accessible.
16The information in Table 2B has been compiled from ocial publications by the Federal Returning
Ocer (Bundeswahlleiter 2005c, 2009b).
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be an incumbent. Therefore, any argument linking dierences in the distribution of list and
candidate votes to strategic behavior must be based on an econometric strategy that carefully
controls for candidates' idiosyncratic appeal.
To this end, the present paper relies on ocial election results by polling precinct (Wahl-
bezirk). These data have been obtained from the Federal Returning Ocer and were until
recently not publicly available. In Germany, precincts are the smallest administrative units
at which votes are counted. Each precinct is fully contained within an electoral district and
associated with one polling station where a returning ocer oversees the election. By law,
no precinct can contain more than 2,500 eligible voters. As of 2009 there were 299 electoral
districts and almost 89,000 precincts. Since races take place at the level of the electoral dis-
trict, precinct level data allow for  to be estimated from within-candidate variation only,
thereby conditioning on all observable as well as unobservable characteristics of candidates
and their competitors, beliefs about tie probabilities, etc.
In order to ensure that list votes are, indeed, a reasonable proxy for individuals' preferences
the main part of the analysis focuses on Germany's ve major parties and on the 2005 and
2009 federal elections. In these years all important parties were widely expected to clear the
5%-threshold.17 Since voters could be virtually certain that their preferred party would be
represented in parliament, list votes should reect preferences more accurately in 2005 and
2009 than in prior years.
Dierentiating between East and West Germany as well as election year, Table 2B dis-
plays summary statistics for all precinct level variables. Compared to the U.S., turnout is
fairly high. Averaging across 2005 and 2009, almost 75% of the electorate went to the polls.
Together with an average size of 821 eligible voters, this means that precincts handle about
615 votes. As is well known, CDU, SPD, FDP, and the Green Party fare substantially better
in West Germany than in the East. The opposite is true for The Left|the successor of the
East German communist party. Moreover, CDU and SPD receive more candidate than list
votes. Since nominees of these two parties are serious contenders in most districts, one would
expect such a \surplus" of candidate votes if voters were, indeed, behaving strategically.
5.2. Testing the Null Hypothesis of Sincere Voting
Following the argument in the introduction, it is straightforward to test the null hypothesis of
no strategic voting. If all individuals cast sincere list and sincere candidate votes, then after
controlling for nominees' idiosyncratic appeal there ought to be a one-to-one relationship
17For instance, more than 90% of adults sampled in the 2009 pre-election survey of the German Longitu-
dinal Election Study (GLES) expected the FDP and Green Party to receive more than ve percent of the
list vote.
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between the two. That is, on the margin an extra list vote should translate into an additional
vote for the nominee of the respective party.
The results in Table 3 show that this is not the case. The ordinary least squares estimates
therein correspond to the econometric model
(3) vCk;r;t = m;k;t + v
L
k;r;t + k;r;t;
where vCk;r;t denotes contestant k's share of the candidate vote in precinct r during election
year t, and vLk;r;t is her party's share of the list vote in the same precinct. To allow for arbitrary
forms of autocorrelation in the residuals as well as for correlation within and across districts,
standard errors are clustered by state. Going from the left of the table to the right the set of
xed eects grows steadily. The most inclusive specication contains m;k;t, a municipality
and year specic candidate xed eect. It, therefore, controls nonparametrically for the
appeal of individual candidates (and that of their competitors) as perceived by the voters in
a given town or village.18
Using this model one can dismiss the null of sincere voting if it is possible to reject H0 :  =
1. Clearly, in all specications that control for candidates' idiosyncrasies the slope between
list and candidate votes is considerably smaller than one. And given the precision of the
estimates in columns (3){(5) the null is rejected at the :01%-signicance level.
Of course, all hypothesis tests are joint tests of the null and the identifying assumptions. In
principle, rejection of H0 could be due to voters' preferences over parties and candidates being
completely uncorrelated, or to list votes being only a very noisy proxy for which candidates
agents prefer (causing attenuation bias).
To rule out this possibility consider Figure 4. Restricting attention to the eventual winner
and runner-up of each race the gure displays a semi-parametric estimate of the relationship
between list and candidate votes, i.e. f () in
(4) vCk;r;t = m;k;t + f

vLk;r;t

+ k;r;t.
If the identifying assumption does, indeed, hold, then for this set of candidates there ought
to be a one-to-one correspondence between both votes irrespective of whether agents behave
strategically. After all, surprises in large scale elections are very rare, and voters have no
incentive to desert someone they should have believed to be in contention for victory. Con-
versely, seeing a slope smaller than unity even for contenders should lead one to question the
assumption that list votes are informative of individuals' preferences over candidates.
18There are usually multiple precincts per municipality, which allows for straightforward identication of
m;k;t.
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Fortunately, Figure 4 provides no indication that this is warranted. On the contrary, there
is an almost one-to-one relationship between list and candidate votes for contenders, and
over most of the range the standard error bands are tight enough to rule out meaningful
deviations from the 45-degree line.19 Based on this evidence one would have to conclude
that list votes provide an excellent proxy for whom individuals would vote if their preferred
candidate was still \in the race." Consequently, failure of the identifying assumptions is
unlikely to cause the rejection of the null hypothesis of sincere voting.
6. Estimating the Extent of Strategic Voting
6.1. Econometric Approach
Although it is important to reject the possibility that all agents act sincerely, the evidence
presented above does not speak to the prevalence of strategic voting. In order to estimate
its extent this paper pursues two related empirical strategies.
The rst strategy follows the argument in Section 4.3 and identies the fraction of sincere
agents from candidates who were clearly not in contention for victory. This approach only
requires that conditional on the equilibrium being observed by the econometrician one can
nd a subset of nominees who voters must have believed to be \out of the race." For this
set of candidates one then estimates
(5) vCk;r;t = m;k;t + v
L
k;r;t + k;r;t;
where all symbols are as dened above.
As long as there is no heterogeneity in the extent of strategic voting it is irrelevant if the
set of included candidates is chosen too conservatively, i.e. if one discards some candidates
who were also believed to be \out of the race." Settling on a too narrowly dened set of
non-contenders will only come at a loss of statistical power, but it will not prevent consistent
estimation of , the parameter of interest.
If, however, there is heterogeneity in  and if this heterogeneity is systematically corre-
lated with who remains in contention for victory, then restricting attention to candidates
who trail far behind might lead to biased estimates. The second (and, therefore, preferred)
empirical strategy addresses this problem by adopting a data driven approach to classifying
contestants.20
19Estimating  for this set of candidates by ordinary least squares results in point estimate of :989 with a
standard error of :018 if muncipality-candiate-year xed eects are included, and 1:021 (:011) if candiate-year
xed eects are used instead.
20Unfortunately, pre-election surveys in Germany are too small to derive reliable estimates of voters' expec-
tations. For instance, in only 50 electoral districts did the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES)|the
best available data source|survey more than 15 adults prior to the 2009 elections.
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To see that the data itself are highly predictive of which candidates end up competing
for a direct mandate consider Table 4, which shows a cross-tabulation of candidates' own
rank (based on the candidate vote) against the standing of their party among voters in the
same district (based on the list vote). Out of the 598 contestants whose party placed rst,
only 41 did not win a direct mandate and a mere 2 nished third or worse. In contrast,
none of the candidates who ran for a party ranked fourth or below came in rst, and only 3
nished second. Overall, the correlation between list and candidate vote based rank is :93.
The evidence, therefore, suggests that voters coordinate on the nominees of the district's
most popular parties.
If one believes that agents do, indeed, play focal equilibria of this type, then contestants
backed by one of a district's two favored parties should be considered serious contenders,
whereas candidates of parties ranked fourth and below are \out of the race." The only
ambiguity arises with respect to those in third place. In practice, almost 10% of third ranked
contestants nish rst or second. Hence, one would want to classify some (but not all) of
them as contenders, especially in cases in which only a few percentage points separate their
own party from the one in second place.
Drawing from the literature on structural breaks in time series data, it is possible to
estimate a cuto value, , separating candidates into contenders and non-contenders. More
specically, the second empirical strategy classies candidate k as a contender if, and only
if, her party trails a district's second most popular one by less than  percentage points.
With this denition in hand, the estimating equation becomes
(6) vCk;r;t = m;k;t + v
L
k;r;t 1
h
vL;2
nd
d;t   vLk;d;t > 
i
+ vLk;r;t 1
h
vL;2
nd
d;t   vLk;d;t  
i
+ k;r;t:
Here, vLk;d;t denotes the list vote share of candidate k's party in district d, and v
L;2nd
d;t is that
of the second most popular party in the same district.
If (6) is correctly specied, then searching for the value of  that maximizes the R2 yields
a super-consistent estimate of the true break point (Hansen 2000). Moreover, under the null
hypothesis that such a point exists, estimates of the model's other parameters are normally
distributed and standard errors need not be adjusted for sampling variability in the location
of the break (see, e.g., Bai 1997).
Although intuitively appealing, there is no guarantee that this method classies all can-
didates correctly. For this reason Section 6.3 performs a series of robustness checks, demon-
strating that results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to more than 25 alternative
assumptions on how voters form beliefs about which candidates are in contention for victory.
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6.2. Main Results
Focusing on nominees of the ve major parties, Table 5 displays the main results. The upper
panel follows the rst empirical strategy and restricts the sample to candidates who trailed
the runner-up by more than 10 percentage points, whereas the lower one implements the
second approach.
The rst row within each panel presents estimates of the share of voters who stick with
their preferred candidate despite her having no chance of winning. Controlling for the idio-
syncrasies of candidates and their competitors, estimates of  range from :613 to :657, and
are fairly precise. Moreover, it is worth noting that the evidence from both empirical ap-
proaches lines up very well. Despite small standard errors, estimates from the rst and
second approach are statistically indistinguishable. Taken at face value, the results indicate
that slightly less than two thirds of voters are sincere, whereas the remaining third abandons
their favorite contestant whenever she is \out of the race."
The crucial question, however, is whether voters do so for strategic reasons. Strictly speak-
ing, any model would be consistent with the evidence in Table 5 as long as it predicts the
candidate-list vote gradient for non-contenders to be smaller than one. For instance, some
individuals may simply vote for whichever candidate advertises the most, and advertising
expenditures might be highly correlated with who remains in contention for victory. It would,
therefore, appear as if voters abandon weak candidates, despite the fact that no agent behaves
tactically.
In order to rule out mechanical explanations of this kind, Table 6 compares the extent
of strategic voting, i.e. 1   , across a number of dierent settings. The rst set of results
demonstrates that individuals' tendency to desert weak contestants depends on who remains
in contention for victory. Voters are about three times as likely to abandon their favorite
candidate when that of an allied party is still \in the race" than when faced with the choice
among two evils.21
Moreover, distinguishing between races that were \close" and those that were not, strategic
voting appears to have been somewhat more prevalent in the former|although the dierence
is not statistically signicant; and disaggregating the data by election year shows that deser-
tion of non-contenders was more common in 2005 than in 2009. The 2005 election followed
a failed motion of condence that triggered the dissolution of the Bundestag and was widely
perceived to be a \critical election" (Korte 2009).22 It is, therefore, hardly surprising that a
21The following parties are dened as close substitutes: CDU and FDP, SPD and Green Party, The Left
and SPD. The dierence in Table 6 is even starker when supporters of The Left are assumed to have no
substitute available.
22Campaigning to stay in oce, Chancellor Schroder and his SPD-Green coalition promised to undo some
of their unpopular labor market and welfare reforms, while raising taxes on the rich. In stark contrast,
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greater number of voters behaved tactically when the stakes were particularly high.23
Taken together, these ndings suggest that it might be more appropriate to consider strate-
gic behavior a conscious decision as opposed to an agent's type. That is, all agents may be
capable of voting tactically, but only for a subset of them do the subjective benets out-
weigh the (psychic) costs. In such a richer model  would not refer to the population share of
strategic types, but to the fraction of voters whose psychic cost are below the endogenously
determined cut-o value.
More importantly, the evidence in Table 6 is at odds with many alternative theories for
why voters abandon candidates who are \out of the race." Any model in which voters defect
candidates for non-strategic reasons would not only have to predict a correlation between
desertion rates and a contestant's chance of winning, but it would also have to explain why
defection is more common when the stakes are higher, and why it depends on who remains
in contention for victory. The patterns in Table 6 as well as the fact that voters who do
cast split-tickets substitute toward candidates of a potential coalition partner (cf. Table 1)
suggest that the observed behavior is, in fact, driven by strategic considerations.
In order to strengthen this claim, Table 7 provides an explicit test of the pivotal voter
model against the alternative that individuals receive utility from voting for the eventual
winner of the election. The entries correspond to the candidate-list vote gradient among
second ranked candidates, by distance to the rst ranked one. If agents did, indeed, have a
taste for supporting the likely winner, then one would expect runner-ups to be abandoned as
well, especially those that trail far behind. By contrast, the model in Section 4 predicts that
voters do not abandon the runner-up, even if her chances of winning are very small. This
is because if a race were to be tied|however unlikely that may be|the tie would almost
certainly involve the second ranked candidate, in which case voting for her would change the
outcome of the election. Although counterintuitive, the evidence in Table 7 does support the
pivotal voter model.
6.3. Sensitivity and Robustness Checks
Misclassication of Contenders For the main results to correctly identify the shares of
each type of voter it must be the case that the regressors are uncorrelated with the error
term. One obvious source of bias may be systematic misclassication of contenders. While
it is unproblematic to falsely classify some candidates who voters believed to be \out of
led by Angela Merkel, the conservative-libertarian bloc sought to further increase the pace and scope of
deregulation, slashing income taxes and public spending in the process.
23Ocial statistics analogous to those in Table 1 show a substantially higher fraction of split tickets in
2005 (cf. Bundeswahlleiter 2006, 2010). Although abstention was approximately 7 percentage points lower
than in 2009, the dierence in turnout alone is too small to account for the nding in Table 6.
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the race" as contenders, making the opposite mistake would lead to upward bias in , and
therefore to an understatement of the extent of strategic voting. To ameliorate this concern,
Table 8 presents estimates of the share of strategic agents employing more than twenty-ve
alternative denitions of contenders (listed in the column on the left). For each denition, the
table shows two estimates: one based on candidate-year xed eects, and another one using
candidate-year xed eects that are specic to individual municipalities. For comparison,
the top row displays the main results from the lower panel of Table 5.
Although individual point estimates do, of course, vary, the majority of them are very close
to their baseline values. For instance, assuming that agents have perfect foresight, one would
estimate the fraction of strategic agents to equal 33:7% instead of 34:4%, whereas adaptive
expectations based on the outcome of the last election would lead to point estimates ranging
from 32:2% to 35:7%. Of the fty-two additional estimates in Table 8 the lowest one is 28:4%
and the highest one equals 41:1%. Slightly more than 90% of point estimates fall within the
original 95%-condence intervals. The evidence, therefore, suggests that misclassication of
contestants is not a serious problem.
Social Interactions & Horizontal Dierences in Candidate Quality There are, however,
other threats to identication. First, the argument laid out in the introduction assumes that
the share of agents who desert non-contenders does not depend on precincts' ideological
composition (i.e. the position on the x-axis in Figure 1). This assumption is not innocuous.
For instance, it rules out peer eects in voting, certain forms of sorting across precincts, or
that the perception of candidate quality varies systematically with voters' political views.
Fortunately, the assumption is testable.
To see this, note that all of the threats mentioned above imply a non-linear relationship be-
tween list and candidate votes for non-contenders. That is, if social interactions or dierences
in candidate perception were important, then one would expect desertion rates (and hence
the slope of the line in Figure 1) to vary systematically with the position on the x-axis. Yet,
estimating the relationship between list and candidate votes semi-parametrically, as shown
in Figure 5, gives little reason to believe that the linearity assumption is problematic.
Moreover, recall that the results in Table 5 reveal only minor dierences between estimates
which constrain voters' assessment of candidate quality to be the same within a given district
and those that allow for the perception of candidates to vary by municipality. Together these
ndings suggest that social interactions and horizontal dierences in candidate quality cannot
explain the results.
Endogenous Nomination of Candidates Another concern relates to the behavior of parties.
Depending on the anticipated likelihood of winning the district, parties might nominate
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a particularly \good" or \bad" candidate. Since the empirical strategy relies on within-
candidate variation, this sort of behavior will only bias the point estimates if candidate
quality interacts with the share of voters who behave sincerely|say, because voters might
be reluctant to abandon very charismatic contestants. Although plausible, the data do not
suggest that \good" candidates, as measured by k;t, are less likely to be deserted when they
are \out of the race." If anything, additional results (available from the author upon request)
show that the covariance between k;t and a non-contender's k is slightly negative.
Also note that the results cannot be driven by comparisons between direct candidates and
those on the party list. While it is theoretically possible that some agents desert their favorite
party's candidate because they would like someone else on the party list to enter parliament
instead (see Section 3 or Appendix A for details on how seats are allocated), this behavior
will not aect the estimates. First, none of the identifying variation comes from candidates
who are in contention for victory, i.e. who have a realistic chance of entering the Bundestag
and for whom this sort of comparison would be relevant. Second, the estimates above are
based on within-candidate variation only, thereby conditioning on the characteristics of direct
candidates, their competitors, as well as those on the party list.
Measurement Error Since list votes are hardly a perfect proxy for preferences over candi-
dates, one may also worry about measurement error. The resulting attenuation bias would
lead to estimates of  that are smaller than one and, therefore, to incorrect inference about
the prevalence of tactical behavior. However, measurement error should not only aect the
estimated candidate-list vote gradient among non-contenders, but also that for contenders.
Thus, looking at the dierence in slopes for both sets of contestants, i.e.    , provides a
way to address this concern. As the second row in Table 9 demonstrates, attenuation bias
does not explain the results. In fact, the estimated extent of strategic voting remains almost
unchanged.
Strategic List Votes As discussed in Section 3, a small number of voters might anticipate
overhang mandates and thus cast tactical list votes. Although the vast majority of voters
cannot reasonably assign a high probability to their preferred party winning an overhang
mandate, it is useful to probe the robustness of the results with respect to this potential
confound. The third row in Table 9 restricts attention to states in which overhang mandates
had never occurred before 2005. Reassuringly, the resulting point estimates are very similar
to their baseline values.
Now, consider the eects of agents casting tactical list votes for any other reason|say,
because they (falsely) anticipated that FDP, Green Party, or The Left would have trouble
clearing the 5%-threshold. There are two cases to distinguish: (i) Some voters might have
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strategically chosen a party whose nominee was in contention for victory. These individuals
do not contribute to identication of  and will, therefore, not bias the point estimates. (ii)
Others, however, might have cast a strategic list vote for a party whose direct candidate was
\out of the race." These individuals do contribute to identication. But as long as they also
deserted the respective non-contender they will be correctly classied as strategic. Only if
they chose the dominated action of voting for a candidate who was not in contention for
victory will they be counted as sincere. Of course, it is not clear whether voters who cast one
tactical vote but waste the other should be deemed strategic or sincere. By classifying them
as the latter the paper errs on the side of caution when it comes to estimating the extent of
strategic voting. That is, if one believes that a non-trivial fraction of voters behave tactically
under proportionality rule but make a \mistake" in the rst-past-the-post system, then the
estimates above provide a lower bound on the \true" extent of strategic behavior.24
It is important to emphasize that the identifying assumption throughout is not that list
votes reveal voters' deep ideological convictions, but merely that they are a good proxy for
individuals' preferences over candidates. For instance, agents may very well take expectations
regarding post-election coalition formation into account and then vote for the party they
would like to gain the marginal seat given these expectations. It only needs to be true that
their choice of party is a good predictor for whichever candidate they would pick conditional
on that candidate having a chance of winning. Given the evidence in Figure 4 this assumption
does appear to be reasonable.
Additional Robustness Checks The remainder of Table 9 demonstrates that the results do
not depend on the weighting scheme or on whether one also includes candidates of \micro
parties."
6.4. Correlates of Strategic Voting
Taken together the results above show that a non-trivial fraction of agents behaves strategi-
cally. Yet, simple averages may conceal considerable heterogeneity across individuals. Since
strategic voters are more likely to be pivotal and thus exert a disproportionate inuence on
the positioning of political candidates, it is also important to understand who votes tactically.
In order to infer whether  varies with the characteristics of agents, the present paper
relies on ocial statistics for the universe of German cities and villages, published by the
24To get a sense of the magnitude of the possible undercount consider the following back-of-the-envelope
calculation. Suppose that one in ten list votes are strategic, and that agents who cast strategic list votes are
not more likely to cast tactical candidate votes than those who submit sincere party votes. In such a case,
Table 5 would understate the \true" extent of strategic voting by about 6 percentage points. Of course, this
number would be substantially smaller if individuals who behave tactically with their list vote were also
more likely to cast strategic candidate votes.
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Federal Statistical Oce and the statistical oces of the Lander (Statistische Amter des
Bundes und der Lander 2007, 2011).25 After aggregating election results to the village level
and focusing on the set of municipalities that are fully contained within an electoral district,
it is straightforward to estimate specications that allow for  to increase or decrease in
some village characteristic.
Table 10 displays the results. The rst column demonstrates that aggregation to the mu-
nicipality level does not materially aect the estimated share of sincere voters. The remaining
four columns examine how  changes with population density, income tax revenue per capita,
as well as the gender and age composition of the electorate. For ease of interpretation co-
variates have been demeaned, so that the estimates in the second row refer to the share of
sincere voters at the sample average.
Interestingly, urban voters are not more strategic than rural ones, nor is there a signicant
gender gap. The results do, however, indicate dierences with respect to socio-economic
status (as proxied by income tax revenue per capita) and age.
Since the income tax variable captures only revenues that accrue to the respective munici-
palities and given that the German tax system is highly non-linear, it is easiest to judge the
magnitude of the coecient by an example. Consider two villages: one's per capita income
tax revenue is a standard deviation below the mean, while that of the other village is one
standard deviation above the sample average.26 The share of sincere voters is estimated to
be almost 6 percentage points higher in the latter.
Disparities by age are much larger. Taken at face value the coecient in column (5) suggests
that the fraction of strategic agents is 24:4 percentage points lower among voters below the
age of 30, i.e. those who could have participated in at most three federal elections. Of course,
this estimate is based on limited variation, and therefore not very precise. But, together with
the results in column (4), it suggests that sophistication and learning aect tactical behavior.
6.5. Learning to Vote Strategically
To further investigate the hypothesis of learning, this subsection uses the German Reuni-
cation as a natural experiment. Although the German Democratic Republic (GDR) held
regular, formal elections to the Volkskammer (People's Chamber), they were eectively mean-
ingless. East Germans could only choose from candidates on a single list controlled by the
Socialist Unity Party (SED), and it was customary to cast one's ballot in public, simply
accepting all nominated candidates. Unsurprisingly, ocial approval rates often exceeded
25Unfortunately, comparable data for polling precincts do not exist. Polling precincts are too small to
produce reliable estimates from existing data sets.
26On average municipalities receive about 13% of all income tax revenues. Thus, the per capita sample
mean is 260 EUR and the standard deviation equals 110 EUR.
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99%. Free, democratic elections were only held on March 18, 1990|after months of peaceful
political protest. The newly elected government then negotiated the end of the GDR.
In stark contrast, citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany have had the opportunity to
participate in free elections since 1949; and from 1953 on under a two-ballot system almost
identical to the current one. Thus, they had more than 40 years of democratic experience by
the time the GDR joined the West.
The rst parliamentary elections in unied Germany were held on December 2, 1990, and
were subject to (essentially) the same rules that had previously been used in the West and
that continue to be in place today.27 If learning and familiarity with the electoral system do
indeed matter, then one would expect large initial dierences in the share of strategic voters,
which should disappear over time.
This prediction corresponds exactly to the ndings in Figure 6. For each election since
1990, the gure plots the estimated dierence in the share of tactical voters between East
and West Germany. Negative values indicate fewer strategic agents among residents of the
former GDR.28
Just two months after reunication, East Germans were almost 16 percentage points less
likely to vote strategically than their Western counterparts. By 2005, however, the gap had
vanished. Although none of the point estimates is very precise, one can nevertheless reject
the null hypothesis of a constant dierence at the 1%-condence level. Moreover, both the
initial gap as well as the speed of convergence are in line with the \age eect" in Table 10.
Thus, as in many laboratory experiments, sophistication and learning appear to be important
determinants of tactical behavior.29
7. Counterfactual Seat Distributions
Although the results above indicate that a large fraction of voters are strategic, they are
ultimately insucient to judge whether lack of strategyproofness is of rst order importance
for electoral outcomes|especially since tactical voting might interact with whom parties
select to run in a particular district. In order to assess the impact of strategic behavior by
27The most important exception was that the 5%-threshold applied separately to East and West Germany.
Thus, in 1990 a party had to gain more than 5% of the list vote in only one of the two regions to enter the
Bundestag.
28The specication on which the estimates are based is similar to equation (6), but allows for dierent
slopes and cuto values in East and West Germany. A qualitatively similar picture emerges if one were to
restrict the cuto to be the same in both regions.
29It is important to note that East Germans gained not only familiarity with the electoral system, but
other economic factors changed as well. If these factors had an independent eect on the propensity to cast
tactical ballots, then the estimates in Figure 6 need not capture the true impact of learning. Convergence in
per capita incomes, however, is almost an order of magnitude too small to explain the results.
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voters and parties, Figure 7 presents several counterfactuals for the 2009 federal election.30
The top left panel shows the actual distribution of seats in the Bundestag, whereas the
panel on the right displays the distribution that would prevail if mandates were awarded
based on a single vote counted under proportionality rule with a 5%-threshold, i.e. the
list vote. Evidently, the actual Bundestag mirrors a parliament formed under proportional
representation fairly closely: all ve major parties are represented, with more than 60% of
seats accruing to the CDU and the SPD. In the current equilibrium, distortions introduced
through strategic candidate votes are very small.
The two remaining panels consider the case of a single vote counted under plurality rule in
the existing 299 districts|akin to elections in many Anglo-Saxon countries. The counterfac-
tual on the bottom left assumes the current extent of tactical voting as well as the current,
strategically nominationed set of candidates. By contrast, in the panel on the bottom right
voters do not misrepresent their preferences and candidates are perfect party representatives.
Note, the German context allows for these counterfactuals to be constructed directly from
the data, i.e. from actual candidate (left panel) and list votes (right panel).31
In line with common intuition, relative to proportional representation a \winner-take-all"
system would result in dramatic losses for small parties. However, as comparing the panels
on the right shows, these losses are due to the way dierent electoral rules map vote shares
into mandates and not to tactical behavior.
The impact of strategic behavior can be gleaned from comparing the two counterfactuals
on the bottom. Given its estimated extent, tactical voting has only modest eects on the
overall allocation of seats. On average the ve major parties' seat shares change by only 2:4
percentage points, and not a single party experiences a change of more than 6 percentage
points. As shown in Appendix Figure A.2, these dierences are considerably smaller in 2005.
Despite a higher estimated extent of tactical voting (cf. Table 6), no party's share of seats
would change by more than 1:3 percentage points if all strategic behavior was shut down.
And Figure A.3 demonstrates that these conclusions do not depend on the assumption that
candidates are perfect party representatives. If anything the eect of strategic voting would
be even smaller if parties were allowed to eld the current set of candidates.32 Although the
impact of stragetic voting depends on the distribution of preferences, at rst glance it might
30Counterfactuals for the 2005 election are qualitatively very similar, and appear in Appendix Table A.1
and Figure A.2.
31An earlier version of this paper estimates a fully structural model of voting decisions (see Spenkuch
2013). Since conclusions from counterfactuals based on the results of the structural model are qualitatively
identical to those that can be derived directly from the data, the present manuscript conserves space by
presenting only the latter.
32The counterfactuals in Appendix Figure A.3 are based on list vote shares adjusted for the municipality
specifc candidate-year xed eects estimated from equation (6).
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appear that lack of strategyproofness has only a small eect on electoral outcomes.
Yet, looking only at seat totals misses an important point. As the evidence in Table 11
indicates, compared to the current equilibrium, about one in ten districts do change hands
as a result of strategic behavior. Thus, even moderate degrees of tactical voting may have
a non-negligible impact on a given race|as predicted by theory. But as the number of
heterogenous districts becomes large, these \distortions" tend to average out. In fact, the
eect of tactical behavior on aggregate seat totals will always be (weakly) lower than that
on individual races.
8. Concluding Remarks
Whether individuals vote strategically is one of the most important questions at the in-
tersection of economics and political science. Although tactical voting has interested social
scientists for decades, it has proven very dicult to determine its extent. The fundamental
problem is that voters' preferences are generally unobserved, which makes it nearly impos-
sible to compare them to actual votes without imposing strong assumptions.
The present paper resolves this problem by exploiting the structure of parliamentary elec-
tions in Germany. The German system allows for preferences to be held xed, while con-
trasting the behavior of the same individuals under dierent electoral regimes. The evidence
indicates that between 30% and 40% of voters behave as predicted by rational choice theory.
Although strategic voting has a non-trivial impact on individual races, its eect on the
overall distribution of seats is considerably more modest. No party's seat total would change
by more than a few percentage points if all voters behaved sincerely. Depending on the
application it may be important to distinguish between the \micro" and \macro" eects of
tactical behavior.
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Figure 1: Theoretical Predictions under Sincere and Strategic Voting
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Notes:  Figure depicts the relationship between list votes and candidate votes for contenders (upper two panels) as well as non-contenders 
(lower four panels) in District 207 during the 2009 federal election. Each dot corresponds to one electoral precinct.
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Figure 2: Empirical Example, 2009 Federal Election in Electoral District 207
Manuel Höferlin, FDP (9.7%) Pia Schellhammer, Green Party (7.3%)
Michael Post, The Left (7.1%) Others (2.3%)
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Figure 3: Distribution of Direct Mandates in the 2005 and 2009 Federal Elections
Notes:  Figure depicts majority of the candidate vote by electoral district and candidates' party affiliation in the 2005 (left) and 2009 (right) federal elections. In the 2005 (2009) election, candidates running 
for the CDU/CSU won the plurality of  votes in 150 (218) out of 299 electoral districts. SPD candidates gained 145 (64) direct mandates. Candidates of the The Left won 3 (16) districts, and the Green Party 
achieved 1 (1) direct mandate. No FDP contestant won a district race.
B. 2009A. 2005
Sources: Based on Bundeswahlleiter (2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2009a). 30
Figure 4: Relationship between List and Candidate Votes for Contenders
Notes:  Figure shows a semi-parametric estimate of the relationship between list and candidate votes for district winners and 
runner-ups, i.e. f(∙)  in equation (4), as well as the associated asymptotic 95%-confidence interval.  f(∙)  is approximated by 
cubic B-splines with knots at every 3 percentage points. Standard errors account for clustering at the state level and have been 
caclulated using the block bootstrap with 1,000 iterations.
Notes: Figure shows a semi-parametric estimate of the relationship between list and candidate votes for non-contenders, i.e. 
f(∙)  in equation (4), as well as the associated asymptotic 95%-confidence interval. f(∙)  is approximated by cubic B-splines with 
knots at every 1.5 percentage points. Standard errors account for clustering at the state level and have been caclulated using 
the block bootstrap with 1,000 iterations.
Figure 5: Relationship between List and Candidate Votes for Non-Contenders
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Figure 6: Difference in the Share of Strategic Voters between East and West Germany, 1990–2009
Notes:  Figure shows the percentage point difference in the share of strategic voters between East and West Germany for each federal 
election from 1990 to 2009 as well as the associated 95%-confidence intervals. Negative values indicate fewer strategic voters among 
residents of the former GDR. The null hypothesis of a constant difference across all years can be rejected at the 1%-confidence level, 
and that of an equal difference in 1990 and 2009 is rejected at the 1%-level as well.
Figure 7: Counterfactual Seat Distributions in the 17th Bundestag
Notes:  Figure depicts counterfactual seat distributions in the Bundestag following the 2009 federal 
election. See the main text for a description of the assumptions underlying each panel.
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Number of Share of Share of
Party Direct Mandates Candidate Vote List Vote CDU/CSU SPD The Left Green Party FDP Others Invalid
CDU/CSU 218 38.7% 33.3% .876 .042 .007 .017 .048 .005 .006
SPD 64 27.5% 22.7% .045 .858 .024 .052 .011 .004 .006
The Left 16 10.9% 11.7% .031 .128 .757 .048 .017 .014 .005
Green Party 1 9.0% 10.6% .061 .333 .036 .536 .021 .008 .004
FDP 0 9.3% 14.4% .458 .048 .011 .021 .448 .009 .005
Others 0 2.9% 5.9% .133 .130 .114 .125 .090 .378 .030
Invalid -- 1.7% 1.4% .117 .079 .025 .013 .021 .013 .732
Source:  Author's calculations based on Bundeswahlleiter (2009a, 2010).
Variable Full Sample CDU/CSU SPD FDP The Left Green Party Others
Age 47.16 49.14 48.87 44.96 49.29 44.01 46.94
(11.97) (9.72) (9.83) (11.29) (10.48) (10.97) (14.45)
Female .226 .191 .353 .169 .259 .344 .139
(.418) (.393) (.478) (.375) (.438) (.475) (.346)
Doctorate .109 .204 .134 .161 .090 .105 .041
(.312) (.403) (.341) (.367) (.287) (.306) (.199)
Currently Member of Parliament .231 .652 .602 .161 .083 .148 .002
(.422) (.477) (.490) (.367) (.277) (.356) (.039)
Holds Direct Mandate .111 .376 .403 .000 .009 .003 .001
(.315) (.485) (.491) (.000) (.092) (.058) (.028)
Also on Party List .626 .759 .950 .888 .434 .546 .414
(.484) (.428) (.218) (.316) (.496) (.498) (.493)
Position on Party List | Also List Candidate 12.89 13.26 17.36 17.47 9.40 8.89 7.32
(12.86) (12.79) (15.46) (15.32) (8.19) (6.94) (7.02)
4,257 598 598 598 587 593 1,283
Notes:  Entries are means and standard deviations of characteristics of direct candidates running in the 2005 or 2009 federal elections, by party affiliation. See 
the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Table 1: Distribution of List and Candidate Votes in the 2009 Federal Election
Candidate Vote as Fraction of Party's List Vote
Notes:  Entries denote each party's number of direct mandates, share of the list and candidate vote, as well as the frequency of different list and candidate vote combinations 
(calculated as fraction of a party's list vote) in the 2009 federal election. Due to rounding entries may not add up to unity.
Table 2A: Characteristics of Direct Candidates
Party Affiliation
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Variable Full Sample 2005 2009 2005 2009
Number of Eligible Voters 820.7 821.5 834.2 782.9 802.5
(406.1) (385.4) (387.6) (460.3) (487.7)
Turnout .747 .789 .727 .751 .658
(.087) (.071) (.083) (.069) (.084)
Share of Candidate Vote (in %):
CDU/CSU 41.07 44.81 41.94 29.65 32.94
(13.02) (13.33) (11.49) (9.93) (10.32)
SPD 32.23 38.73 28.80 31.35 20.03
(12.61) (12.66) (10.71) (8.28) (7.54)
FDP 7.04 4.59 9.66 5.16 8.17
(3.93) (2.25) (3.74) (2.85) (3.73)
The Left 9.66 3.95 7.35 24.86 28.61
(9.67) (3.06) (4.01) (7.37) (8.46)
Green Party 6.87 5.46 9.32 3.76 5.53
(5.29) (3.78) (5.23) (5.80) (6.08)
Others 3.08 2.38 2.88 5.22 4.72
(2.88) (2.75) (2.59) (3.10) (2.70)
Share of List Vote (in %):
CDU/CSU 35.47 38.67 35.59 26.21 30.65
(11.60) (12.48) (10.25) (8.59) (8.92)
SPD 27.98 34.22 23.62 29.96 17.95
(10.91) (10.84) (8.63) (7.16) (5.94)
FDP 12.01 10.10 15.18 8.00 10.57
(4.83) (3.56) (4.61) (3.25) (3.76)
The Left 10.43 4.83 8.40 25.05 28.27
(9.23) (3.09) (4.26) (6.26) (7.56)
Green Party 8.83 8.38 10.93 4.78 5.90
(5.38) (4.87) (5.25) (4.13) (4.93)
Others 5.23 3.71 6.23 6.01 6.66
(2.85) (2.03) (2.76) (3.03) (3.03)
Absentee Precinct .148 .155 .166 .090 .098
(.355) (.362) (.372) (.286) (.297)
177,425 71,614 72,056 17,110 16,645
Table 2B: Summary Statistics for Electoral Precincts
Notes:  Entries are means and standard deviations for all precinct level variables used in the analysis, differentiating 
between East and West Germany as well as election year. See the Data Appendix for a precise definition of each 
variable.
West Germany East Germany
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Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of List Vote 1.205 1.018 .936 .937 .891
(.022) (.012) (.007) (.008) (.014)
Constant -3.440
(.430)
Fixed Effects:
Party No Yes No No No
Candidate No No Yes No No
Candidate × Year No No No Yes No
Candidate × Municipality × Year No No No No Yes
R-Squared .936 .961 .979 .980 .987
Number of Observations 882,061 882,061 882,061 882,061 882,061
Rank Based on
Candidate Vote 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 557 38 3 0 0 0
2 39 502 54 3 0 0
3 2 44 369 139 39 5
4 0 14 131 306 138 9
5 0 0 39 139 332 87
6 0 0 2 11 88 474
Total 598 598 598 598 597 575
First or Runner-Up 99.7% 90.3% 9.5% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0%
Notes:  Entries denote the number of candidates for each combination of own rank based on received candidate votes (left 
column) and the within district ranking of the associated party based on the list vote in the same year (top row). For 
instance, out of the 598 candidates whose party received the most list votes within a particular district, 557 won the direct 
mandate for that district, 39 candidates finished in second place, and 2 ended up third. The rank order correlation within 
districts is .93.
Table 3: Testing the Null Hypothesis of Sincere Voting
Share of Candidate Vote
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating equation (3) by ordinary least squares. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Table 4: Ranking of Candidates in the 2005 & 2009 Federal Elections
Rank Based on List Vote
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A. Candidates Trailing Far Behind
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of List Vote .621 .682 .670 .632 .613
(.027) (.013) (.010) (.014) (.016)
Constant .676
(.193)
Fixed Effects:
Party No Yes No No No
Candidate No No Yes No No
Candidate × Year No No No Yes No
Candidate × Municipality × Year No No No No Yes
R-Squared .622 .717 .816 .832 .885
Number of Observations 463,544 463,544 463,544 463,544 463,544
B. All Candidates
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of List Vote .819 .765 .696 .657 .656
× Non-Contender (.063) (.022) (.021) (.019) (.026)
Share of List Vote 1.118 1.060 .982 1.004 .977
× Contender (.016) (.010) (.010) (.012) (.021)
Non-Contender -.596 3.664 -3.887
(.441) (.433) (.614)
Contender .649 6.477 -.742
(.767) (.717) (.140)
Structural Break .009 .021 .065 .064 .023
Fixed Effects:
Party No Yes No No No
Candidate No No Yes No No
Candidate × Year No No No Yes No
Candidate × Municipality × Year No No No No Yes
R-Squared .951 .965 .980 .982 .989
Number of Observations 882,061 882,061 882,061 882,061 882,061
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating equation (5) (upper panel) and 
equation (6) (lower panel) by ordinary least squares. The upper panel restricts the sampel to candidates 
who finished more than 10 percentage points behind second place, whereas the lower panel includes all 
candidates. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses. 
See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Table 5: Estimating the Extent of Strategic Voting
Share of Candidate Vote
Share of Candidate Vote
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Fixed Effects: Candidate × 
Restriction Candidate × Year Municipality × Year 
Baseline .343 .344
(.019) (.026)
By Availability of Close Substitute:
Allied Party's Candidate in the Race .366 .379
(.015) (.018)
Only Rival Parties' Candidates in the Race .138 .115
(.015) (.012)
By Difference Between Winner and Runner-Up:
< 1% .382 .394
(.043) (.034)
1% and 5% .356 .378
(.026) (.028)
> 5% .312 .338
(.026) (.026)
By Year:
2005 .452 .512
(.027) (.016)
2009 .236 .274
(.025) (.021)
Fixed Effects: Candidate × 
Distance to First Ranked Candidate Candidate × Year Municipality × Year 
Based on Preferences:
< 2% behind First Ranked Candidate 1.025 1.008
(.013) (.017)
2% to 5% behind First Ranked Candidate 1.019 .988
(.012) (.017)
5% to 10% behind First Ranked Candidate 1.058 1.032
(.015) (.019)
10% to 15% behind First Ranked Candidate 1.044 .996
(.021) (.035)
> 15% behind First Ranked Candidate 1.033 .992
(.023) (.044)
Based on Ex Post Outcome of Races:
< 2% behind First Ranked Candidate 1.025 1.008
(.020) (.033)
2% to 5% behind First Ranked Candidate 1.042 1.024
(.014) (.018)
5% to 10% behind First Ranked Candidate 1.049 1.019
(.014) (.018)
10% to 15% behind First Ranked Candidate 1.061 1.024
(.024) (.029)
> 15% behind First Ranked Candidate 1.022 .975
(.016) (.035)
Table 7:  Candidate-List-Vote Gradient among Second Ranked Candidates
Slope
Notes:  Entries denote the candidate-list-vote gradient for second ranked candidates, by distance to 
the first ranked one. The respective cutoffs are shown in the column on the left. Heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses.
Table 6:  Comparative Statics
Share of Strategic Voters
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors on  1-λ  estimated from equation (6), using 
different subsamples of the data. The respective restriction is indicated on the left of each row. 
See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
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Fixed Effects: Candidate × 
Classification of Contenders Candidate × Year Municipality × Year 
Baseline (Preference Based, Original Cutoff) .343 .344
(.019) (.026)
Ex Post Outcome of Races (Original Cutoff) .345 .349
(.018) (.026)
Preference Based Using Different Cutoffs:
< 1% behind Second Ranked Candidate .295 .332
(.029) (.028)
< 2% behind Second Ranked Candidate .307 .339
(.027) (.027)
< 5% behind Second Ranked Candidate .331 .359
(.021) (.020)
< 8% behind Second Ranked Candidate .352 .377
(.017) (.017)
< 10% behind Second Ranked Candidate .366 .391
(.015) (.014)
< 12% behind Second Ranked Candidate .385 .411
(.012) (.009)
Ex Post Outcome of Races Using Different Cutoffs:
< 1% behind Second Ranked Candidate .310 .342
(.027) (.028)
< 2% behind Second Ranked Candidate .317 .348
(.026) (.026)
< 5% behind Second Ranked Candidate .337 .365
(.020) (.021)
< 8% behind Second Ranked Candidate .350 .374
(.018) (.020)
< 10% behind Second Ranked Candidate .368 .387
(.014) (.016)
< 12% behind Second Ranked Candidate .382 .403
(.011) (.011)
Ranked First or Second Based on Preferences .284 .324
(.030) (.030)
Ranked First, Second, or Third Based on Preferences .299 .335
(.023) (.017)
Ranked First or Second Based on Ex Post Outcome .305 .337
(.029) (.029)
Ranked First, Second, or Third Based on Ex Post Outcome .371 .400
(.013) (.014)
Finished First or Second in Last Federal Election .287 .322
(.032) (.034)
Finished First, Second, or Third in Last Federal Election .319 .357
(.015) (.011)
Finish in Last Federal Election (Original Cutoff) .316 .330
(.026) (.031)
Finish in Last Federal Election Using Different Cutoffs:
< 1% behind Second Ranked Candidate .291 .326
(.031) (.032)
< 2% behind Second Ranked Candidate .296 .330
(.030) (.032)
< 5% behind Second Ranked Candidate .313 .344
(.027) (.029)
< 8% behind Second Ranked Candidate .322 .352
(.024) (.027)
< 10% behind Second Ranked Candidate .329 .358
(.022) (.023)
< 12% behind Second Ranked Candidate .337 .366
(.019) (.019)
Table 8:  Sensitivity Analysis Using Alternative Classifications of Contenders 
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors on 1-λ using alternative classifications of "contender." The 
respective definition is shown in the column on the left. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
clustered by state and reported in parentheses.
Share of Strategic Voters
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Fixed Effects: Candidate × 
Restriction Candidate × Year Municipality × Year 
Baseline .343 .344
(.019) (.026)
Difference Estimator .347 .322
(.027) (.038)
In States without Overhang Mandates .376 .391
(.029) (.031)
Weighted by Number of Party Supporters .322 .328
(.029) (.037)
Including "Other" Party Candidates .341 .355
(.020) (.025)
Share of Candidate Vote
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of List Vote 1.008 1.008 1.008 1.008 1.008
× Contender (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Share of List Vote .666 .644 .664 .605 .679
× Non-Contender (.031) (.029) (.030) (.033) (.022)
Share of List Vote -.005
× Non-Contender × Population Density (.007)
Share of List Vote .019
× Non-Contender × Fraction of Voters Female (.023)
Share of List Vote -.271
× Non-Contender × Income Tax Revenue per Capita (.078)
Share of List Vote .244
× Non-Contender × Fraction of Voters under Age 30 (.074)
Candidate × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared .984 .984 .984 .984 .984
Number of Observations 120,700 120,700 120,700 120,700 120,700
Table 9:  Additional Sensitivity and Robustness Checks
Share of Strategic Voters
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors on the share of strategic voters, i.e. 
1-λ,  using different subsamples of the data and weighting schemes. The respective 
restriction is indicated on the left of each row. See the Data Appendix for the precise 
definition and source of each variable.
Table 10: Correlates of Strategic Voting
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating specifications analogous to equation (6) by ordinary least squares, with a structural break at κ=.064. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses. For ease of interpretation, covariates interacted with Share of List Vote × Non-
Contender have been demeaned.  In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate are also included in the 
regressions. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
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District Winner
with No Strategic Behavior CDU/CSU SPD FDP The Left Green Party
CDU/CSU 70.90% 5.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SPD 0.33% 15.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.33%
FDP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
The Left 1.67% 1.00% 0.00% 5.35% 0.00%
Green Party 0.00% 0.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 11: District Level Impact of Strategic Behavior, 2009 Federal Election
District Winner in Current Equilibrium
Notes:  Entries compare the distribution of district winners in a first-past-the-post system with only 
sincere voters and no strategic nomination of candidates (left column) to the one that would obtain 
with a mixture of types and tactical nomination (top row). Summing across columns gives the 
percentage of districts that would acrue to a particular party if all voters behaved sincerely and if 
parties could not strategically nominate candidates, whereas summing across rows gives a party's 
share of districts in the current equilibrium. Consequently, adding the entries on the diagonal 
shows that about 91% of districts would accrue to the same party.
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APPENDIX MATERIAL
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
Appendix A: Calculating a Party's Number of Seats
Following Spenkuch (2013), this appendix explains the algorithm that is currently used to calculate
a party's number of seats in the Bundestag. Let dp;s denote the number of direct mandates accruing
to party p in state s. vp;s is the number of list votes that p received in s, with the equivalent number
on the national level given by vp =
P
s vp;s. With this notation in hand, party p's seat total is
calculated in three steps:
Step 1: Proportional Allocation of List Mandates to Parties. Absent overhang mandates, there
are 598 seats in the Bundestag. These are allocated by proportionality rule to the set of parties
clearing the 5%-threshold or winning at least three direct mandates. That is, the number of list
mandates of party p equals
lp =
8<: 598
vpP
p02eP vp0 if p 2 eP
0 otherwise
;
where eP = pj vpP
p0 vp0
 :05 _Ps dp;s  3 and = represents equality after rounding according to
the Sainte-Lague method, which ensures that
P
p lp = 598.
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Step 2: Proportional Allocation of Mandates to State Lists. German electoral law requires parties
to compete with dierent lists in each state. Therefore, list mandates need to be allocated to
the respective state lists. In practice, the number of mandates awarded to a party's state list is
proportional to the list's contribution to the party's vote total. More precisely, for all s and all p,
lp;s =
8<: lp
vp;s
vp
if p 2 eP
0 otherwise
;
where = is dened as above.
Step 3: Determination of the Actual Number of Seats. However, the actual number of seats that
party p receives in state s is given by
np;s = max fd p;s; lp;sg :
If d p;s < lp;s then, in addition to the district winners, the rst lp;s  d p;s candidates on p's list in
s are elected to the Bundestag as well. Otherwise, only holders of direct mandates receive a seat.
Note that only if d p;s  lp;s for all s, will party p's seat total, np = Ps np;s , be equal to the
number of seats it would be assigned under proportional representation, i.e. lp.
33In 2005 the method of Hare-Niemeyer was used instead.
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Appendix B: Marginal Seats, and Sincerity under Plurality Rule
To clarify in which sense agents can be expected to vote for the party they wish to gain the \marginal
seat" in parliament this appendix provides a simple model of voting under proportionality rule in
large elections.
Individual i receives utility u(v) from realized vote totals v = (vp)p2P .
34 Thus, conditional on v,
i would choose party p only if u(vp + 1; v p)  u(vp0 + 1; v p0) for all p0 2 P . Rewriting u(v) aseu(s) with sp  vpP
p02P vp0
, it is easy to show that in large elections the previous condition is closely
approximated by @eu(s)@sp  @eu(s)@sp0 . Let ' (s) denote i's belief about the probability of event s being
realized (not counting her own vote). With this notation in hand, it will be the case that i chooses
to vote for p whenever
(7)
X
s
' (s)
@eu(s)
@sp

X
s
' (s)
@eu(s)
@sp0
for all p0.
Note, abstracting from rounding proportionality rule implies that sp does not only equal party
p's own vote share, but also its seat total in parliament. Thus,@eu(s)@sp denotes the utility gain to i
from p winning the \marginal seat" conditional on the distribution of seats being s; and equation
(7) shows that agents vote for the party that gives them the highest expect marginal utility from
a small increase in its seat share.
Appendix C: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: To demonstrate existence of voting equilibria this proof adapts the
xed point argument in Myerson (1998, 2000).
First, let ex ante beliefs about pivot probabilities be accurate and express expected utility as a
function of voters' strategies:
bu{ (; ) = X
k2K
24 (kj{) X
2Z(K)
0@ Y
k02K
 
 

 
k0
 j  k0j
1A p (k;  j{)
35 ;
with payos given by p (k;  ju; s) = uk and
(8)
p (k;  ju; t) =
8>><>>:
1
2 (uk   uk0) if 9k0 2 K s.t.  (k0) =  (k) ^  (k)   (k00)8k00 2 Kn fk0g
1
2 (uk   uk0) if 9k0 2 K s.t.  (k0) =  (k) + 1 ^  (k)   (k00) 8k00 2 Kn fk0g
0 otherwise
.
Here bu{ denotes the expected utility of a type { 2 I voter who pursues strategy  2  (K)
34In the context of Germany it is useful to think of u(v) as conditional on the expected outcome in the
plurality rule part of the system, i.e. the district level races.
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when everybody else plays  2  (K)I ,  (kj)  nPu2U [ (kju; s) + (1  ) (kju; t)] f (u),
and Z (K) is the set of all possible action proles, i.e. the number of other players who choose
actions ( (k))k2K .
35 Next, dene the best response correspondence B :  (K)
I   (K)I such
that, for all , B = (B{ ()){2I , where B{ ()  fjbu{ (; )  bu{ (0; )80 2  (K)g. With these de-
nitions in hand it suces to show that there exists a set of mixed strategies for which  2 B ().
The remainder of the proof veries that the conditions for Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem are
satised.
By denition of  (K) as k-dimensional simplex,  (K)
I
is a non-empty, compact, and convex
subset of a nite dimensional Euclidean space.
As bu = (bu{){2I is continuous, it follows from the denition of B, compactness of  (K)I , and the
Weierstrass Extreme Value Theorem that B () is non-empty.
Moreover, B () is convex-valued. To see this note that if 0; 00 2 B{ (), then, for all  2 [0; 1],
bu{ (0; ) + (1  ) bu{ (00; )  bu{ (000; ) 8000 2  (K). Also, bu{ (0; ) + (1  ) bu{ (00; ) =bu{ (0 + (1  ) 00; ) because bu{ is linear in . Together with the previous statement this implies
0 + (1  ) 00 2 B{ (), as required.
By way of contradiction suppose that B () does not have a closed graph. Then there exists a
sequence (n; n) ! (; ) such that n 2 B (n) but  =2 B (). Hence, 90 2  (K) and some
 > 0 for which u{ (
0; ) > u{ (; ) + 3. From continuity of bu{ and since n ! , it follows
that for n large enough, u{ (
0; n) > u{ (0; )  . Combining the two preceding inequalities gives
u{ (
0; n) > u{ (; ) + 2, and continuity of bu{ implies that u{ (; ) + 2 > u{ (n; n) + . But
u{ (
0; n) > u{ (n; n) +  contradicts n 2 B (n). Hence, B () must have a closed graph.
From Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem it then follows that there exists at least one  2  (K)I for
which  2 B (), as desired. Q.E.D.
Appendix D: Variable Denitions
This appendix provides a description of all data used in the paper, as well as precise denitions
together with the sources of all variables.
D.1. Election Results
Data containing the ocial results of the 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, and 1998 federal elections
by municipality (Gemeinde) as well as the 2002, 2005, and 2009 elections by polling precinct (Wahl-
35Note that (8) could have alternatively been expressed as
p (k;  ju; t) =
8>><>>:
uk if  (k)   (k0) + 1 8k0 2 Kn fkg
1
2 (uk   uk0) if 9k0 2 K s.t.  (k0) =  (k) ^  (k)   (k00)8k00 2 Kn fk0g
1
2 (uk   uk0) if 9k0 2 K s.t.  (k0) =  (k) + 1 ^  (k)   (k00)8k00 2 Kn fk0g
uk0 if 9k0 2 K s.t.  (k0) >  (k) + 1 ^  (k0)   (k00)8k00 2 K
.
In (8) strategic voters care only about inuencing the outcome of the election, whereas in the formulation
above they derive utility from whichever candidate wins the elections. Since payos dier only by a constant,
the two specications are equivalent.
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bezirk) have been purchased from the Federal Returning Ocer. These data include information
on the number of list and candidate votes for each party and each candidate, the number of eli-
gible voters, as well as the number of valid and invalid votes. In 2009 there were approximately
89,000 precincts. Whenever necessary precinct level numbers are aggregated using the municipal-
ity identiers contained in the raw data. Municipalities spanning multiple districts are discarded.
Throughout the analysis the following variables are used:
Number of Eligible Voters is dened as the number of residents of each precinct that were allowed
to vote in the particular year. In general this encompasses all German citizens over the age of 18,
who have not been declared mentally unt, or whose voting rights have not been suspended due to
criminal behavior.
Turnout is dened as the number of actual voters over the number of eligible voters. This number
cannot be calculated for absentee precincts, as absentee voters are included in the number of eligible
voters in their district of residence. Hence, in-person turnout in each district needs to be adjusted
for absentee voters. In practice, this is done by multiplying the number of issued absentee ballots
by .95 (which corresponds to the empirical frequency with which they are cast) and adding them
to the ballots that are cast in person.
Share of List Vote is dened as the portion of all valid list votes (in %) that are cast for a particular
party. \Micro parties", i.e. those not clearing the 5%-threshold, are grouped together.
Share of Candidate Vote is dened as the portion of all valid candidate votes (in %) that are cast
for the candidate of a particular party. Votes for candidates of \micro parties" are pooled.
Absentee Precinct is an indicator variable equal to one if a given precinct handles only absentee
ballots.
D.2. Candidate Characteristics
Prior to every election to the Bundestag the Federal Returning Ocer publishes information on
certain characteristics of all ocial list and direct candidates. This paper focuses only on the latter.
The data have been compiled from Bundeswahlleiter (2005c, 2009b). Throughout the analysis the
following variables are used:
Age at the time of the election is dened as election year minus year of birth.
Female is an indicator variable equal to one if a candidate is female, and zero otherwise.
Doctorate is an indicator variable equal to one if a candidate holds a doctoral degree and/or a
professorship, and zero otherwise. As doctoral degrees are part of Germans' ocial names, this
variable has been created using a text search for \Dr." and \Prof.".
Currently Member of Parliament is an indicator variable equal to one if the candidate holds a list
or direct mandate, and zero otherwise.
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Holds Direct Mandate is an indicator variable equal to one if the candidate holds a direct mandate,
and zero otherwise.
Also on Part List is an indicator variable equal to one if the candidate does not only run in the
district race, but is also on her party's state list (and could thus enter the Bundestag either way).
Position on Party List denotes the candidate's rank on her party's state list (conditional on having
been placed on the list).
D.3. Municipality Characteristics
Information on municipalities' demographic and socio-economic characteristics is taken from Statis-
tik lokal 2007 and Statistik lokal 2011 (Statistische Amter des Bundes und der Lander 2007, 2011).
Statistik lokal is an annual publication of the German Federal Statistical Oce and the statistical
oces of the Lander containing data on various characteristics of approximately 12,000 municipal-
ities and administrative units in Germany as of about 2 years before to the publication date. These
data have been linked with the election results described above using the municipality identier
(Allgemeiner Gemeindeschlussel) contained in both data sets. Below follows a brief description of
all municipality level variables used throughout the analysis.
Population Density is dened as a municipality's total average population (in thousands) per square
kilometer during the respective calendar year.
Fraction of Voters Female is dened as the share of women among a municipality's population over
the age of 18.
Income Tax Revenue Per Capita is dened as the total income tax receipts (in 1,000 EUR) accruing
to the respective municipality divided by its population during the same calendar year.
Fraction of Voters under Age 30 is dened as the fraction of individuals aged 18{30 among those
over the age of 18.
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Figure A.1: Ballot for the 2009 Federal Election (Electoral District 207)
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Figure A.3: Counterfactual Seat Distributions in the 16th & 17th Bundestag
Notes:  Figure depicts counterfactual seat distributions in the 16th (left panel) and 17th (right panel) 
Bundestag assuming plurality rule on the district level, sincere voting, and the actual set of candidates.
Notes:  Figure depicts counterfactual seat distributions in the Bundestag following the 2005 federal 
election. See the main text for a description of the assumptions underlying each panel.
Figure A.2: Counterfactual Seat Distributions in the 16th Bundestag
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District Winner
with No Strategic Behavior CDU/CSU SPD FDP The Left Green Party
CDU/CSU 47.49% 2.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SPD 2.68% 46.49% 0.00% 0.33% 0.33%
FDP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
The Left 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.67% 0.00%
Green Party 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table A.1: District Level Impact of Strategic Behavior, 2005 Federal Election
District Winner in Current Equilibrium
Notes:  Entries compare the distribution of district winners in a first-past-the-post system with only 
sincere voters and no strategic nomination of candidates (left column) to the one that would obtain 
with a mixture of types and tactical nomination (top row). Summing across columns gives the 
percentage of districts that would acrue to a particular party if all voters behaved sincerely and if 
parties could not strategically nominate candidates, whereas summing across rows gives a party's 
share of districts in the current equilibrium. Consequently, adding the entries on the diagonal 
shows that almost 95% of districts would accrue to the same party.
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